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GOD AND ABSTRACT ENTITIES 
Brian Leftow 
Alvin Plantinga's Does God Have a Nature? has ignited debate over God's 
relations to abstract entities. Recently Thomas Morris and Christopher 
Menzel have suggested a way to maintain that God creates all abstract enti-
ties, including those attributes which He instances essentially. After defend-
ing the Morris-Menzel position against some initial objections, I argue that 
it generates the unacceptable consequence that God creates Himself and fails 
to secure the claim that God creates His nature. In closing I suggest that 
Aquinas' claim that God is "purely actual" may avoid the problems of Morris 
and Menzel's view and secure the relation of God to abstract entities which 
they favor. 
There appears to be a conflict between traditional theism and the Platonist 
ontologies which many contemporary philosophers favor. Traditional theism 
holds that God is the creator of everything distinct from Himself, and that 
whatever God creates depends on God for its existence. So traditional theism 
entails that whatever is distinct from God depends on God for its existence. 
Contemporary Platonist ontologies affirm the existence of such abstract en-
tities as possible worlds, propositions and attributes. To Platonists, all these 
abstracta are distinct from God, and most exist by "broadly logical" neces-
sity.1 Necessary beings seem not to depend on God for their existence. If 
something exists necessarily, we want to say, it exists simply because it is 
this thing's nature to exist, just as God, according to Descartes' ontological 
argument, exists because it is His nature to exist. If necessary abstract entities 
do not depend on God for their existence, then by positing these, contempo-
rary Platonism contradicts the traditional theistic claim that whatever is dis-
tinct from God depends on God for its existence. 
Alvin Plantinga, at once Platonist and theist, addresses the apparent incon-
sistency of theism and Platonism in his Does God Have a Nature?2 Plantinga 
reasons that if necessary truths are indeed necessary, the abstract entities their 
truth-conditions involve exist necessarily: if it must be the case that 7+5=12, 
then it must be the case that the number 7 exists. But having said this, 
Planting a asks whether we can 
explain the existence ofthe number 7 by citing the fact that it is part of God's 
nature to affirm its existence ... If we can ... then perhaps we can point to an 
important dependence of abstract objects upon God ... 3 
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In his APA Presidential address, delivered some two years later, Plantinga 
affirms this dependence: 
A proposition exists because God thinks of or conceives it. .. propositions are 
best thought of as the thoughts of God ... God is a necessary being who has 
essentially the property of thinking just the thoughts he does think; these 
thoughts, then, are conceived or thought by God in every possible world and 
hence exist necessarily.4 
Plantinga thus tries to harmonize Platonism and traditional theism by denying 
that propositions exist by their very natures. Rather, Plantinga suggests, prop-
ositions exist necessarily but nonetheless depend on God, being thoughts 
which He thinks in all possible worlds. In their "Absolute Creation," Thomas 
Morris and Christopher Menzel endorse Plantinga's reconciliation of tradi-
tional theism and Platonism and extend it to the rest of the Platonic domain: 
numbers, attributes, etc. are for them God's "ideas," and exist only because 
God thinks them.3 Morris and Menzel dub their extension of Plantinga' s view 
"theistic activism." I want to suggest that theistic activism's picture of God's 
relation to abstract entities is false, and suggest an alternative picture. 
I. Can necessary beings depend on God? 
For theistic activism, abstract necessary beings depend on God. In fact, 
according to activism, abstract entities exist necessarily only because God 
necessarily exists and necessarily thinks them. This claim is surprising. Thus 
theistic activism's first order of business must be to explain how a genuinely 
necessary being can owe its existence to God. I think activism can do this, 
and I will briefly suggest how. 
If the activist claim surprises us, it is because we believe (for instance) that 
for any x, if x exists necessarily, then x is uncausable, or of independent 
existence, or that for any x, if x exists necessarily, then x exists in virtue of 
its nature. If we believe either conditional, we believe it because we think 
that the nature of necessity renders this claim true. But an activist can argue 
that these (and any other such) conditionals are false, and derive their spe-
cious plausibility from insufficiently precise understandings of alethic neces-
sity. In currently popular semantics, "x exists necessarily" asserts only that 
x is to be found in every possible world. It entails nothing at all about why 
this is so; it leaves open the question of whether there may be some cause or 
causes which account for this. If this is so, the conditionals just mentioned 
may well be false, and so may well not create difficulty for the claim that 
necessary beings depend on God. In any event, it seems that intuitions about 
necessity do not conflict with activism, for they do not warrant the condi-
tionals mentioned. 
Philosophers in fact have intuitions to which activists can appeal. Many 
philosophers, like Kant, find ontological arguments for God's existence du-
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bious because these seem to infer God's real existence from the fact that the 
concept of God includes His being a necessary existent. As Jerome Shaffer 
puts it, 
even if we have ... the concept of an object which necessarily exists, a further 
question remains whether any existent meets the specifications of the con-
cept.6 
Let us say that if an entity A is such that if it exists, it exists necessarily, then 
A is necessary by nature. Then what Shaffer asserts is that for any A, knowing 
that A is necessary by nature is not sufficient for knowing that A exists. If 
we leave aside the question of whether God may not be an exception, most 
philosophers will agree with this. Shaffer's point raises a question, though: 
what explains this insufficiency? The explanation may be that knowledge that 
A is necessary by nature is not of the right kind to warrant our asserting that 
A exists. Or it may be that however much we know about A, our knowledge 
of A's nature is never sufficient to let us know whether A is both a possible 
being and necessary by nature. Both explanations are compatible with its 
being the case that" A is necessary by nature" entails" A exists"; they merely 
assert that even if this is so, we do not know enough to take advantage of the 
entailment. But I think Shaffer's point, with which many philosophers agree, 
is that" A is necessary by nature" just does not entail" A exists." This is the 
intuition to which theistic activism can appeal. For if "A is necessary by 
nature" does not entail" A exists," one may ask what accounts for the failure 
of this entailment. Theistic activism can recommend itself by offering an 
answer to this question, namely that even if" A is necessary by nature" is 
true, something more is needed for A to exist, and the something needed is 
a cause able to account for the fact that A exists at all. 
There is clearly a lot more to be said here on both sides.' But perhaps this 
at least suggests that being necessary by nature does not preclude depending 
on God for existence. In any event, even if this point is granted, there is 
another likely line of attack on theistic activism. A critic may contend that 
we can make no sense of the dependence a necessary being is said to have 
on God. The critic may have something like the following in mind. If my 
match's lighting depends on my striking it, I can explain this by saying that 
if I had not struck it and if no relevantly similar event had occurred, the match 
would not have lit. But it is not clear that a theistic activist can similarly flesh 
out his assertion that necessary beings depend on God. An activist can cer-
tainly say that 
1. had God not created it, proposition P would not exist. 
According to theistic activism, "God created P" is necessarily true. Thus on 
activist principles, (l)'s antecedent is necessarily false, and so (1) is true. 
But on activist principles, it also seems true that 
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2. had God not created it, P would still exist, and 
3. had nothing created it, P would still exist, and 
4. if God did not exist, P would stilI exist. 
For if "God created P" is necessarily true, (2)-(4) have necessarily false 
antecedents. If (2)-(4) are true, though, one may well suspect that the claim 
that P depends on God has no content, even if (1) is also true. 
Let me try to allay this suspicion. (4) poses no problem peculiar to theistic 
activism. If God exists necessarily, then if in (4) one replaces "P" with a 
name of any contingent entity, the resulting proposition will be true. So any 
problem (4) raises for the claim that God creates necessary beings arises as 
well for the claim that God creates contingent beings. This does not show 
that (4) creates no trouble for theistic activism. My point is only that any 
trouble it creates arises because activism incorporates the claim that God 
exists necessarily, not because of any peculiarity of the dependence which 
activism claims necessary beings to have on God. (2) and (3) are a bit trickier. 
But I think activism can deal with them (and also dispose of (4» by urging 
that not all conditional propositions with impossible antecedents are created 
equal. Rather, the activist may say, where a conditional's antecedent involves 
God's not existing, special rules apply in virtue of God's special relation to 
propositions.8 At first glance, this move has an air of hopeless ad hocery. I 
think we can lessen this appearance by showing that it is well-grounded in 
the activist theory of God's nature and creative role. 
To activism, if God does not exist, nothing else necessary or contingent 
exists either: the only world in which God does not exist is the (absolutely) 
null world. This renders God's non-existence unlike any other impossible 
state of affairs. To explain this, I need to set out some theses about possible 
worlds. I propose that a non-null world is a set of propositions which for 
every atomic proposition P either includes P or includes not-P, and that a 
possible world is a non-null-world-sized set of propositions which is consis-
tent, Le., such that all its member propositions can be true together. I also 
propose that the null world is the null set of propositions. As I am advocating 
a set-theoretic view of possible worlds, I take it that there is neither more nor 
less difficulty in talk of the null world than in talk of the null set. 
If God is a necessary being, any world in which God does not exist (Le., 
the null world) is an impossible world. But we need not say that every 
impossible world is the null world. A set of propositions can be both a 
non-null world and inconsistent. 
For instance, suppose that there is a set S of propositions such that for all 
atomic propositions P save for a proposition Q, S includes P or includes not-P, 
but not both, and 
5. S includes Q, and 
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6. S includes not-Q. 
If «5) . (6» is true, then «5) v (6» is true. But our definition of worldhood 
requires only that «5) v (6» be true. Hence S is a world, and an impossible 
world, then, will be either the null world or an inconsistent world-sized set 
of propositions, such as S. 
Any impossibility except for God's nonexistence, including the nonexist-
ence of necessary beings other than God, occurs in some set of inconsistent 
worlds. But God's non-existence occurs only in the null world. Any world 
containing God's non-existence is ipso facto identical with the null world. 
That God's non-existence occurs in the null world does not entail that the 
proposition "God does not exist" exists in the null world. It does not exist 
there. In the null world, no propositions exist, and so none are true (or false). 
God's nonexistence is a logical "black hole," sucking all the propositions of 
a world into itself. But while nothing is true in the null world, there are truths 
(and falsehoods) about the null world, e.g., that it is null and that God does 
not exist in it.9 The propositions expressing these truths exist only in other, 
non-null worlds. 
This metaphysical framework expresses the unique status God's non-exis-
tence must have among impossibilities according to activism. It also lets us 
distinguish semantically between counterfactuals whose impossible anteced-
ents involve God's not existing and counterfactuals whose impossible ante-
cedents do not. From any ordinary impossibility, anything whatsoever 
follows. Thus if any ordinary impossibility were actual, all other states of 
affairs would be actual and possible. But God's nonexistence occurs only in 
the null world. If God did not exist, no states of affairs would be actual or 
possible. Thus God's nonexistence is in fact unlike any other impossibility, 
on the activist view of things. Because an ordinary impossibility entails 
everything, we usually assign trivial truth to all conditionals with ordinarily 
impossible antecedents. Any conditional with an antecedent involving God's 
nonexistence is a claim about the null world. This permits us to say that some 
such conditionals are non-trivially true and others are non-trivially false. For 
instance, in the null world, nothing exists. So any proposition entailing that 
something exists in the null world will be non-trivially false. 
Let us now apply all this to (2)-(4). Adopting David Lewis' connective for 
"would" -counterfactuals, .. 0-- ", we may symbolize these as 
2* T 0--+ R 
3* Q 0--+ R 
4* S 0--+ R 
Necessarily, if God does not exist, then God does not create P. On activist 
principles, "God creates P" is necessarily true, and so too then is "if God 
does not create P, God does not exist." So given activism, we have 
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The conjunction of (2*) and (7) entails (4*). (7) is necessarily true (given S4 
or SS). For all propositions <I> and'll, if <I> in conjunction with a necessary 
truth entails'll, <I> entails'll. So (2 *) entails (4*). Again, on activist principles, 
necessarily, God does not exist iff nothing creates P. So by the same sort of 
move, we see that (3*) entails (4*). On the principles I am ascribing to theistic 
activism, (4*) is a claim about the null world, that if the null world existed, 
P would exist. As so taken, (4*) is clearly false. If so, then on our assump-
tions, (2)-(4) are false. By contrast, (1) remains-unproblematically true. For 
as (l)'s antecedent does not involve God's not existing, (1) is still to be 
treated as all other counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are. So I think 
theistic activism has resources to vindicate its claim that necessary beings 
depend on God. For the activist can hold that (1) is true while (2)-(4) are 
false, and that this gives the activist claim content. 
II. God's power over modality 
That necessary beings depend on God entails that though God somehow 
causes these beings to exist, God is not in control of their existence: it is not 
in His power to refrain from creating them. For were this in God's power, 
these would not be genuinely necessary beings. Rather, it would be possible 
that they not exist. Now the assertion that God creates the bearers of modal 
status (the propositions which are possible and necessary) leads theistic ac-
tivism to a nearly Cartesian thesis, that God is in a strong sense responsible 
for the necessity of what is necessary and the possibility of what is possible. 
To activism, necessary beings (or truths) are necessary because God creates 
them as existing (or being true) in all possible worlds, and possible beings 
(or truths) are possible because God creates them as existing (or being true) 
in some possible world. That God could not have done otherwise does not 
efface the fact that He alone has done it. Because it grants that God could 
not have done other wise, activism rejects such Cartesian claims as that God 
can make or could have made some necessary truth non-necessary, or that 
God can deny or could have denied existence to some necessary proposition. 
But though it denies such Cartesian theses about God and modality, the 
activist claim is almost as strong. This emerges in Morris and Menzel's 
remarks on the "modal problem of evil." 
The modal problem of evil lies in the inconsistency of the following set of 
claims: 
8. Necessarily, if a world W is actual, God creates W. 
9. Necessarily, God is of perfect moral goodness. 
10. Possibly an evil world exists. 
Given (8), if possibly an evil world exists, then possibly God creates an evil 
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world. Thus (10) and (8) in conjunction entail that possibly God creates an 
evil world. But plausibly, given (9), God is not possibly the creator of an evil 
world. 1o Theistic activism's response to this inconsistency is to deny (10), 
holding that since God is necessarily the creator of whatever world exists and 
God is necessarily good, no evil world is in fact possible." For activism, 
God's nature constrains the possible in such a way that 
some maximal groupings of propositions which, if per impossibile God did 
not exist, would constitute possible worlds, do not count as genuinely possi-
ble worlds due to the constraints placed on possibility by the nature of the 
creator. 12 
This denial of (10) is not ad hoc, but is a consequence of activism's distinc-
tively theistic metaphysics of modality. For activism, God's causal activity 
is the source of whatever reality possible worlds have. But God can act only 
in accord with His nature. If it is God's nature to be perfectly good, then He 
produces no possible worlds which would be evil if actual. For if God pro-
duces such a possible world, then possibly He creates it. But as God is by 
nature perfectly good, God's nature is such that God cannot create an evil 
world. Thus no evil world is possible. This does not however entail that no 
evil world exists. For Morris and Menzel, a world is a set of propositions. So 
for them, if a certain set of propositions exists, a certain world exists. A set 
exists if its members exist and there are no set-theoretic reasons (such as the 
generation of paradoxes) for its not existing. This makes it plausible that evil 
worlds do exist, given the reasonable assumption that the propositions com-
posing them also figure in the makeup of non-evil worlds. Thus Morris and 
Menzel call evil worlds "maximal groupings of propositions" which do not 
"count as" genuine possible worlds, a phrasing which implies that these 
groupings (and so these worlds) exist. But again, though these worlds exist, 
they are not possible worlds, and God's nature explains why they are not 
possible. So for theistic activism, God's nature delimits possibility, prevent-
ing evil worlds' being possible. 
Now since God does not control what His nature is, this activist position 
does not entail that God controls the existence of evil worlds. But it does 
show that God's causal responsibility for the existence of abstracta puts His 
distinctive stamp on the facts of modality-that even though these facts could 
not be otherwise, there is a sense in which God determines their character. 
Further, Morris and Menzel hold while God necessarily creates the abstract 
entities He creates, the necessity of this creation stems solely from God's 
own nature, and this creation is free in the sense that it is "conscious, inten-
tional, and neither constrained nor compelled by anything existing indepen-
dent of God and his causally efficacious power."13 Thus activism claims for 
God an exalted status which Descartes sought to ascribe to Him, that of being 
in some sense the free determiner of what is necessary and what is possible. 
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Yet activism avoids Descartes' thesis that God could have made the modal 
facts other than they are. 
III. Problems of Activism 
If it is tenable, then, activism offers a variety of features which should 
excite theists. Let us however examine this view more closely. For activism, 
God necessarily creates necessary truths and beings, yet 
the necessity of his creating (these) is not imposed on Him from without, but 
rather is a feature and result of the nature of his own activity itself, which is 
a function of what he is. 14 
That is, God's creation of necessities is necessary in that it freely establishes 
a framework of necessities relative to which it counts as necessary, freely 
creating the possible worlds which are such that in all of them, God creates 
the necessities He does. The activity by which God does this flows only from 
Himself. Ultimately, it is necessarily true that 2+2=4 only because God is 
what He is-because He is such as to think that necessarily, 2+2.,4. So God's 
necessity-creating activity flows from God's nature. That is, it seems that we 
can explain this activity, but can explain it only by saying that it takes place 
because God is what He is. Theistic activism not only countenances but insists 
on this sort of explanation. The activist claims that God's morally perfect 
nature puts its stamp on His activity of creating possible worlds. Thus the 
activist claims that because God is what He is (Le., because His nature 
includes moral perfection), God thinks into possibility only good worlds. 
But then just as God's being what He is explains the (alleged) fact that all 
possible worlds are good, His being what He is explains the fact that all these 
worlds are such that 2+2=4, and indeed explains the whole character of the 
realm of necessary truth. In fact, according to activism, it is a necessary truth 
that all possible worlds are good, and so God's character's explaining the 
goodness of all possible worlds is just one instance of the more general 
phenomenon of God's character's explaining the nature of all necessary truth. 
In saying that according to activism, God's nature determines that God 
shall make 2+2=4 or shall create only good worlds, I am not claiming that 
some abstract entity somehow forces God's creative hand. I am saying that 
according to activism, God's creating the necessities he does is explained, 
and the explanation of this lies solely in God's being what He is. Now God's 
being what He is includes His exemplifying the essential attributes He does. 
But if God creates all attributes, God creates the attributes He instances 
essentially. Morris and Menzel grant this: 
God has properties ... essentially ... for whose existence his eternal intellective 
activity is creatively responsible. IS 
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That God creates His essential attributes, and does so because He is what He 
is, leads to three difficulties. 
A. God's being what He is includes His instancing His nature, i.e., having 
all the attributes which He necessarily has. The attributes which God instance 
sexist only because God creates them. But God is able to create them because 
He is what He is, i.e., instances His nature. Thus on the activist picture, God's 
having His necessary attributes is a causally necessary condition of God's 
having His necessary attributes. Thus God is God because God makes it so, 
and odder still, God makes it so because He already is God. But this just 
seems impossible. It seems that for any states P and Q, if p's obtaining is 
causally necessary and sufficient for Q's obtaining, there must be some asym-
metrical relation between P and Q such that Q's obtaining presupposes P's 
and not vice-versa. No state can have an asymmetrical relation to itself. So 
God's having His necessary attributes cannot do so. 
B. God's essential attributes exist only if God creates them. But God can 
create them only if He instances them, and He instances them only if they 
exist. So it seems that to activism, God's attributes' coming to exist presup-
poses that they already exist. But if they already exist, how can they then be 
created? That is, for activism, these attributes' existing is a causally necessary 
condition for their existing. Again, this seems impossible. 
c. According to activism, God's being what He is explains His creating 
the necessities He does. But it also seems that His creating the necessities 
He does explains His being what He is, for His necessary character is part of 
the structure of necessities He creates. How can this be? 
Given these consequences, one might want to drop either the claim that 
God's being what He is explains the character of what He creates, or the 
claim that God creates His nature. But if the activist drops the first claim, he 
gives up his distinctive approach to the modal problem of evil. Nor can he 
drop the second. In addition to what has been discussed, activism has two 
other reasons to assert that God creates His own nature. 
First, its very project requires this. Theistic activism seeks to square Platon-
ism with the traditional theistic belief that everything other than God depends 
on God by holding that God is the source of all abstract entities, including 
attributes. God has some attributes essentially. If God creates all attributes 
save the ones He Himself instances essentially, the claim that whatever exists 
depends on God is incompatible with the claim that the attributes which God 
instances exist, and so Platonism and traditional theism are to this extent 
unreconciled. So if God creates all attributes, as activism maintains, He 
creates even the attributes He instances essentially. 16 
Again, on the activist account, for any possible state of affairs S, God's 
activity explains the fact that S is possible. This leads in a second way to the 
position that God creates His nature. For if God makes possible all possible 
202 Faith and Philosophy 
states of affairs, and it is possible that God exists, God must make His own 
existence possible. Now if something's making itself actual is absurd or 
unintelligible, something's making itself possible seems even more so. But 
activism offers an account of how God is supposed to do this. According to 
activism, God creates the attributes whose conjunction constitutes His nature. 
Given S5, that the divine nature exists entails that it has its actual modal 
status, as possibly exemplified. For the divine nature to be possibly exempli-
fied is for God's existence to be possible. Thus the activist claim that God 
creates His own nature secures the claim that God makes Himself possible. 
Thus activism is irrevocably committed to the twin claims which generate 
A-C. In section V below, I will consider and reject an activist argument which 
if successful would rob A-C of their sting. First, though, I would like to 
discuss another problem for activism. 
IV. Does God create Himself? 
The claim that God creates His essential attributes seems to yield yet a 
fourth difficulty: given the common theistic belief that God is necessary by 
nature and one plausible modal axiom, it seems to entail that God creates 
Himself. Let "G" stand for the proposition "God exists." Then the claim that 
God is necessary by nature is that G~ 0 G. This claim leads to the following 
argument. 
11. G -300. 
12.0G. 
13. (G -300) -3 (OG -0 00). 
14. OG -30 00. 
15. ¢OG. 
16.¢OG-3G. 
17.G. 
18. OG--3G 
premise. 
assumption for conditional proof. 
Instance of modal theorem. 
11, 13, modus ponens. 
12, 14, modus ponens. 
instance of Brouwer axiom. 
15, 16, modus ponens. 
11-17, conditional proof. 
Now if God's nature exists, then it is possibly instantiated, i.e., 0 G. So per 
(18), if God's nature exists, then God exists: if God creates His nature, He 
creates a necessary and sufficient condition of His own existence. This seems 
to amount to God's creating Himself. Morris and Menzel claim to avoid this 
consequence: 
••. the claims we are espousing do not entail that God creates Himself. God 
stands in a relation of logical dependence to His nature (a trivial result of the 
strict necessity of both relata). His nature stands in a relation of causal 
dependence to Him. It simply does not follow that God stands in a relation 
of causal dependence to Himself. Relations of logical dependence are always 
transitive. Relations of continuous causal dependence are always transitive. 
But we have no good reason to think that transitivity always holds across 
these two relations. If God creates some bachelor, the existence of this bach-
elor is logically sufficient for the existence of some unmarried man ... But the 
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transitivity we thus see across the causal and logical dependence relations 
holds only in case the unmarried man is one and the same individual as the 
bachelor ... God is not identical with His nature. (So) we can reject the infer-
ence that from God's nature causally depending on God, and God's logically 
depending on His nature, it follows that God causally depends on Himself.17 
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The argument, then, is that if God causes His nature to exist, and His nature's 
existing entails God's existing, it does not follow that God causes God to 
exist, save on the condition that God" God's nature. This argument's crucial 
premise is that 
19. for all x, y and z, if x causes y to exist, and y's existing entails but does 
not cause z's existing, it follows that x causes z to exist only if y"z. 
But (19) appears false. Let "T" denote my thought at 4:30 on April 9, 1988, 
that I want to have lamb for dinner. Let "E" denote an event in my brain 
which took place at or very shortly before T did. Then consider the following 
claims: 
20. T E. 
21. T's existing does not cause E to exist. 
22. E causes T to exist, and it is not "broadly logically" possible that anything 
other than E directly cause T to exist. (That is, any other thing which causes 
T to exist must do so by causing E to exist.) 
23. it is not "broadly logically" possible that a non-divine thought exist uncaused. 
(22) and (23) jointly entail that 
24. T's existence entails E's existence. 
(20)-(23) are not obviously inconsistent or incoherent; they make up what is 
in fact a: reasonably plausible position. But given (20), (21) and (24), if we 
let y = T and z = E, then if some x causes y to exist, it follows that that x 
causes z to exist, even though y t< z. Thus if (20)-(23) are true, (19) is false. 
Still, some may find the second conjunct of (22) controversial. So let us 
construct a second counter-example by changing the referent of "E." Instead 
of having "E" denote one particular brain-event, let it denote whatever in any 
possible world satisfies the description "the process or activity of thinking 
T." In this case (20)-(23) are very likely true. One could respond to these 
examples by strengthening (19) to 
25. for all x, y and z, if x causes y to exist, and y's existing entails and is en-
tailed by but does not cause z's existing, it follows that x causes z to exist 
only ify=z. 
But (25) too seems false. For 
26. necessarily, E does not exist unless T exists (at some time). 
With "E" read in our second way, (26) is true. For with "En so understood, 
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E does not exist unless a process of thinking T exists, and nothing can be a 
process of thinking T unless it actually manages to think T at some time. 18 
(20)-(23) plus (26) constitute a counter-example to (25). 
Faced with this further example, one could replace (19) and (25) with 
27. for all x, y and z, if x causes y to exist, and y's existing entails and is 
entailed by z's, and y does not cause z to exist, and z does not cause y to 
exist, it follows that x causes z to exist only if y=z. 
But (27) is of no help to Morris and Menzel. In the case of God and God's 
nature, x=z, and so it is not possible that x causes y to exist and z does not 
cause y to exist: an activist cannot apply (27) to his position. 
If my reasoning is correct, then, Morris and Menzel do not manage to show 
it false that if God creates His nature, God creates Himself. Can we therefore 
conclude that on the activist theory, God creates Himself? In the absence of 
any reason not to draw this conclusion, one would think so. One may draw 
this conclusion via the claim that 
28. for all x, y and z, if x causes y to exist, and y's existing entails and is 
entailed by but does not cause z's existing, it follows that x causes z to 
exist. 
If (28) is true, then if both God and God's nature are necessary beings, God's 
creating His nature entails that God creates Himself. In fact, if (28) is true, 
then if God exists necessarily, God's creating any necessary being entails that 
God creates Himself. But (28) does seem true. For suppose that y=z. In this 
case y's existing entails and is entailed by z's but does not cause z's, and in 
this case clearly, if x causes y to exist, x causes z to exist. Suppose on the 
other hand that y '" z, but still y's existing entails and is entailed by z's but 
does not cause z's, and that X cannot cause z to exist because z already exists, 
prior to x' action (the priority here may be temporal, causal or logical). If z 
exists, I suggest, it follows that y too already exists, prior to x' action (in the 
same way z is prior), and so x cannot cause y to exist either. Suppose finally 
that y '" z, but still y's existing entails and is entailed by z's but does not 
cause z's, and that z does not already exist. If in this case x causes y to exist, 
x will do something which entails that z exists, and so z will exist. If x is not 
therefore the cause of z's existing, either (a) the laws of logic themselves, 
apart from x, then bring z into existence, (b) z comes to exist uncaused, or 
(c) some wholly distinct agent causes z to exist, by an extraordinary coinci-
dence, or (d) x's acting logically necessitates that some wholly distinct agent 
acts to produce z. As (a)-(d) all appear massively implausible, (28) corre-
spondingly seems plausible. 
Still, though (28) is plausible, it is not beyond question. So let me show 
that activism entails divine self-creation without relying on (28). Theistic 
activism asserts that divine activity accounts for the necessity and truth of 
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all necessary truths. But among the necessary truths God's activity thus 
accounts for is the truth that God exists. So theistic activism seems committed 
to the claim that God's activity makes it true that God exists. This seems to 
amount to God's creating Himself. Again, if God's existing is a necessary 
state of affairs, and God's activity accounts for the obtaining of all necessary 
states of affairs, then God's activity accounts for the obtaining of the state 
of affairs that God exists. So it is hard to see how an activist could avoid 
affirming that God creates Himself. 
Let us note a consequence of this. If my arguments are correct, activism 
entails that in all possible worlds, God creates His nature and that in all 
possible worlds, God creates Himself. Thus activism must also endorse the 
conditional that if God creates His nature, God creates Himself. If (as I will 
argue) God cannot create Himself, this conditional will let us infer that God 
cannot create His nature either, and so that activism must admit that there 
are abstract entities God cannot create. 
v. Can God create Himself? 
Now it seems to me that it is just impossible that God create Himself, and 
that if theistic activism entails that He does, it is just unacceptable. However, 
it has been suggested that perhaps God can create Himself. 19 Suppose that 
time is without beginning or end, that God exists at all times, and that for 
any time t, God's activity at t-l is responsible for His existence at t. We 
can do things which at least help to assure that we will exist later. So why 
can't God wholly assure that He will exist later? If He can, and if for every 
t at which God exists, God's activity at a prior time accounts for His existence 
at t, then at every moment, God exists because God has caused Himself to 
exist-and so, it seems, God exists because He has created Himself. Yet we 
do not have to say that the state of affairs God's existing is asymmetrically 
related to itself. For the relata of our causal relations are not things or states 
of affairs taken as occurring timelessly or omnitemporally but occurrences 
of states of affairs at different times.20 
Now in this response, the activist depicts God as everlasting causing Him-
self to continue to exist. God's continuing to exist is not the same state of 
affairs as God's existing, even if the obtaining of each strictly implies the 
obtaining of the other. For these states of affairs are identical only if in them 
the same particular exemplifies the same attribute. But the attributes of ex-
isting and continuing to exist are distinct. Every entity has the first but not 
the second at the first moment of its existence, and if there are any instanta-
neous entities (as I doubt) or timeless entities (as I believe there are), they 
have the first but not the second. Again, that God continues to exist entails 
(and not by a paradox of implication) that there are times, through which God 
continues to exist. That God exists does not entail that times exist (save by 
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a paradox of implication, if time exists necessarily). Now if the situation 
described is one of God's causing Himself to continue to exist, and continuing 
to exist'" existing, the activist cannot simply claim to have described God's 
causing Himself to exist. He must rather be offering implicitly some such 
argument as the following: 
29. Possibly, for all t, at t God causes God to continue to exist at t+ 1. 
30. Necessarily, for all t, God continues to exist at t iff God exists at t. 
31. Necessarily, for all x, y and z, if x causes y, and necessarily, y's existing en-
tails and is entailed by z's existing, x causes z. (The particulars these variables 
range over include occurrences of states of affairs, such as God's existing at t.) 
32. So possibly, for all t, God at t causes God to exist at t+ 1. 
33. Necessarily, if for all t, God at t causes God to exist at t+ 1, then omnitempor-
ally, God causes God to exist. 
34. Necessarily, if omnitemporally, God causes God to exist, God creates Him-
self. 
35. So possibly God creates Himself. 
This argument fails, I submit, because (34) is false. It seems to me that if 
omnitemporally, God causes God to exist, it follows only that God everlastingly 
preserves Himself. This is quite a different matter from His everlastingly creating 
Himself, because creation and preservation are distinct concepts.21 That some-
thing is created entails that it is brought from non-existence into existence. That 
something is preserved does not entail that it is brought from non-existence, 
though it does entail that that thing is kept from non-existence. That something 
is created does not entail that that thing previously existed, save by a paradox 
of implication, if it is the case that necessarily, the thing created previously 
existed. That something is preserved does entail (and not by a paradox of impli-
cation) that it previously existed and that its past existence is continued. Now 
that God at t+ 1 is caused to exist by God at t entails that God existed prior to 
t+ 1. If God exists necessarily (as activists hold), He cannot have gone out of 
existence between t and t+l, and so necessarily, His existence at t+1 continues 
His prior existence. Thus the activist response sketched seems more aptly called 
a case of preservation than a case of creation.22 
If this is so, (33) is likely false as well. For I suspect that the difference 
between creation and preservation is not merely conceptual: the characteristic 
effect of creation is existence, the characteristic effect of preservation is 
continuing to exist, and existing and continuing to exist are two distinct 
attributes.23 But if the effect of preservation is continuing to exist, and the 
activist picture just sketched is only a case of preservation, then the picture 
does not warrant us in asserting that omnitemporally, God causes God to 
exist, as (33) says that it does. Rather, it can only warrant the claim that God 
causes Himself to continue to exist. 
Let me offer a second argument against (34). Even if "God always contin-
ues to exist" entails "God always exists," it does not fully explain the latter. 
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Even if God always assures His continued existence, one can still intelligibly 
ask "but why does God exist at all to assure His existence, rather than always 
not exist"? That He has always existed and always assured His continued 
existence is not a satisfying answer to this question.24 Now if P does not fully 
explain Q, DP doesn't fully explain [Q; if that all men are mortal does not 
fully explain that all triangles are trilateral, neither does the fact that neces-
sarily, all men are mortal fully explain the fact that necessarily, all triangles 
are trilateraI.2s So that the question "but why does God exist" seems in place 
supports the claim that God's necessarily everlasting continuance (EC) does 
not fully explain God's necessarily everlasting existence (EE). This claim, 
that 
36. Ee does not fully explain EE, 
generates an argument, for which I will also need the premises that 
37. causal sufficiency is a transitive relation 
and that 
38. (x)(y)(if x causally suffices for y, x fully explains y). 
My argument, then, is this. Given (36) and (38), Ee does not causally suffice 
for EE. Then per (37), whatever causally suffices for Ee does not by so doing 
causally suffice for EE. In the activist response above, God's activity causally 
suffices for Ee. (29)-(35) purport to show that by so doing, He causally 
suffices for EE. If (36)-(38) are true, He does not. Thus (27)-(38) constitute 
an inconsistent set of propositions; at least one of them is false. The most 
rational move is to reject the one with the least intuitive warrant. It seems 
clear that this is (34). Hence it is most rational to reject (34). But again, if 
(34) is false, the activist response sketched above does not really involve 
God's creating Himself. 
The activist cannot weaken his claim from "God everlastingly creates Him-
self' to "God everlastingly preserves Himself." If all God does is cause 
Himself to continue, there is a necessary state of affairs for whose obtaining 
God is not creatively responsible, namely EE (as vs. EC). To allow this would 
amount to giving up the activist project of rooting all necessary facts in the 
creative activity of God. So activism remains committed to self-creation, and 
does not seem able to provide a model of self-creation which could convince 
us that it is possible. 
It is of course very plausible that self-creation is in fact not possible. But as 
activists dispute this, let me argue it explicitly. To create God is to account 
for God's existing at all (as vs. continuing to exist). To account for God's 
existing at all is to account for the fact that the set S of times at which God 
exists has any members. It seems to me that if God exists beginninglessly, and 
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His actions account for His existence at moments later than the moments of 
His action, no action of God at any time can account for S' having members. 
For suppose that God's action at t does so. Then this action accounts for 
S' having members subsequent to t. If God acts at t, t is itself a member of 
S. Thus at t, S already has a member, and so whatever prior act of God 
accounts for t's membership in S has already sufficed ipso facto to account 
for the fact that S has members. Thus God's act at t cannot do so. Suppose 
then that God's action at t-l accounts for God's existing at t. Then if God 
acts at t-l, t-l is itself a member of S, and so whatever prior act of God 
accounts for t-1's membership in S has already accounted for the fact that S 
has members, and so on. As God exists beginninglessly, then, no act of His 
at any moment can account for the fact that He exists at all. As creating any 
entity = accounting for the fact that it exists at all, thus God cannot create 
Himself, if His actions account for His existence at later moments. Nor can 
we intelligibly suppose that God's actions at t account for His existence 
before t. Nor can God at t create God at t, for if God already exists at t, He 
cannot then cause Himself to exist at t. Now if God at t cannot cause Himself 
to exist (as vs to continue to exist) at, before or after t, God at t cannot create 
Himself at all. 
If God cannot cause Himself to exist, the activist project of rooting all 
necessities in the activity of God fails. Further, we argued above that if God 
creates His nature, He creates Himself. If this argument works, then as God 
cannot create Himself, it follows that God cannot create His nature. Moreover, 
even if this argument be rejected, we have still shown that God cannot create 
His nature. Arguments A-C in section III above raised difficulties which seem 
if not dispelled to entail that God just cannot do so. When we raised these 
arguments, we noted that we would consider an attempt to blunt their force. 
This attempt would consist in re-applying the strategy sketched at the start of 
this section: it would interpret God's creating His nature as God's acting at 
t-l to assure that His nature exists at t, acting at t to assure that His nature 
exists at t+l, and so ad infinitum. But we have now shown that on this model, 
God would not create His nature, but at most would everlastingly preserve it. 
He could not account for its existing at all, rather than not existing. No other 
model of God's creation of His nature is available. So we are entitled to 
conclude that God just cannot create His nature. If so, the activist reconcilia-
tion of Platonism and traditional theism fails in another way, as it falls short 
of allowing God to create all abstracta. The failure of activism leaves us the 
task of explaining just what God's relation to abstract entities (if there are 
such things) may be. Let me close with just a hint of an alternate approach. 
VI. On God and possibility 
First, let me motivate this alternate approach. Plausibly, possibilities come 
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in interlocking systems rather than as discrete, disjoint entities. For instance, 
for it to be possible that God exists, it must be possible that a creator ex nihilo 
exist. If it is to be possible that a creator ex nihilo exist, worlds which He 
can create must be possible. If God is essentially omnipotent, and omnipo-
tence involves (very roughly) being able to actualize all states of affairs which 
are in fact possible, all these states of affairs must be possible, as part of what 
it is for God to be possible. Suppose now that God is possible and cannot 
make Himself possible: that is, cannot create His nature. Plausibly, if God 
cannot make Himself possible, He cannot make possible any state of affairs 
whose possibility is bound up with His-that is, any other fact of possibility. 
Rather, all states of affairs must then be possible "logically before" God 
exists. The realm of possibility must on this assumption exist independent of 
God. If this realm consists of Platonic entities, then, Platonism must remain 
unreconciled with traditional theism. 
Further, we saw above that 
18. ¢ G -3G. 
If this is so, then arguably whatever accounts for God's being possible suf-
fices to account for His being actual. Now if possibilities come in interlocked 
systems, and God's existing is possible, it seems that God possibly exists 
because there exists an appropriate network of possibilities, one which in-
cludes His being possible. If God possibly exists and cannot make Himself 
possible, then the realm of possibility exists independent of Him. Its nature 
accounts for the truth of []G. So its nature arguably accounts for the truth of 
G. Thus if God possibly exists and cannot make Himself possible, it can seem 
that God is a creature of an independent, antecedently given realm of possi-
bilities. Not God but the realm of possibility is the ultimate source of all that 
exists, if this is so, because the realm of possibility gives rise to God, from 
whom all else stems. Theists will surely object to this. 
So if God possibly exists and cannot make Himself possible, arguably God 
cannot account for the facts of modality or the existence of any necessary 
abstracta these facts involve, and God is a creature and servant of Ideal 
masters. Both consequences conflict with traditional theism; hence if these 
consequences do follow, the traditional theist must modify his stance or reject 
one of the premises. We have seen that God in fact cannot make Himself 
possible.26 This suggests that if the above argument is correct, traditional 
theists should consider denying that possibly God exists. 
A second motivation for this denial arises from the problems we have raised 
for theistic activism. Theistic activism ran into trouble because it held God 
to be an instance of attributes He creates: because God's nature was among 
the exemplifiable entities the activist's God creates. Now God's nature is an 
exemplifiable entity iff possibly God exists. So activism can also be said to 
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stumble because it claims that the God who is the ground of possibility is 
Himself possible. Again, activism went awry because "God exists" was 
among the necessary truths for whose truth it held God to be responsible. Yet 
an activist cannot hold that God exists contingently, for no contingent being 
could create a necessary entity. Now every actual existent which also possibly 
exists exists contingently or necessarily. One sympathetic to activism's pro-
gram might, therefore, want to consider holding that while God actually 
exists, He does not possibly exist-that is, that while God actually exists, He 
is not the sort of entity which one can say possibly exists. If this claim could 
be maintained, it would secure the activist's extension of God's creative 
activity to necessary abstracta and the facts of modality while avoiding the 
difficulties to which activism fell prey. 
VII. Pure actuality and abstract entities 
Can a traditional theist deny that God possibly exists? I think so. Though 
it sounds outrageous, this denial is not new. That God actually exists but does 
not possibly exist is precisely the import of Aquinas' claim that God is pure 
actuality. Part of what Aquinas means by this is that in God there are no 
unactualized possibilities. But he also means that in God there are no actu-
alized possibilities either. Thomas writes in the Summa Contra Gentiles that 
In every composite there must be act and potency. For several things cannot 
become absolutely one unless among them something is act and something 
potency. Now, beings in act are not united except by being, so to speak, 
bound or joined together ... Their parts, likewise, are brought together as being 
in potency with respect to the union, since they are united in act after being 
potentially unitable. But in God there is no potency. Therefore there is no 
composition in Him.27 
Aquinas' point is that God cannot contain components because if He did, an 
aspect of His being would be a fulfilled potentiality that these components 
come together to compose Him. That Aquinas sees this as incompatible with 
God's being purely actual indicates that for him, God's pure actuality ex-
cludes both unfulfilled and fulfilled potentialities. Now Aquinas often dis-
tinguishes potentialities from mere logical possibilities, and in some contexts 
the distinction is important for him.28 Here, though, it is not. According to 
Thomas, God's power ranges over the full extent of the logically possible.29 
Hence if God is possibly F, God has the power to effect it that God is F and 
so God is potentially F: corresponding to a possibility for God, realized or 
unrealized, there would be a potentiality in God, realized or unrealized.30 
Thus God can be without realized potentiality only if He is not in any respect 
the actualization of a possibility. 
This entails that in a language perspicuously representing the divine being, 
on Aquinas' terms, locutions such as "possibly God ..... or "God possibly ..... 
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would be banned, even as consequences of locutions such as "actually 
God ... " or "God actually .... " We place an entity within the framework of 
possible worlds to represent formally the truth-conditions of statements of 
possibility about that entity (and statements of actuality and necessity, insofar 
as these are connected with possibility). Hence if strictly speaking, there 
cannot be statements of possibility about God, He is not the sort of thing that 
can properly be "located" within a possible world. 
If God, though actual, is not possible, then God's actuality or activity can 
account for all possibility without having to account for His own possibility. 
Further, if God cannot exist within a possible world, He cannot exemplify any 
of the attributes facts about which constitute the framework of necessary truths 
which all possible worlds instantiate (for if He did exemplify these, He would 
ipso facto exist within a possible world). Thus God can create all abstract entities 
without instantiating any of them. The claim that God is purely actual, then, 
reconciles theism and Platonism while avoiding Cartesianism (as activism does) 
and also avoiding the distinctive difficulties of activism. 
VIII. Some explanations 
The Thomist thesis I have briefly set forth raises a great many questions. 
I hope to deal with some of these on a future occasion, but several may seem 
too pressing to ignore. First, the Thomist claim that God is purely actual is 
certainly not supposed to entail that the proposition "God actually exists" is 
false. But "God actually exists" entails that possibly God exists, and if God 
is purely actual, it is false that possibly God exists. So if God is purely actual, 
must we deny that God actually exists, or deny the venerable dictum that ab 
esse ad posse valet consequentia? Again, what happens to modal discourse 
generally and to modal talk about God in particular given the Thomist thesis? 
Finally, what can one mean by saying that God exists, but not in a possible 
world? 
Thomas suggests a response to the first question in Contra Gentiles: 
we do not know of what sort this being is ... by which God subsists in Himself 
... (in) reference ... to the being that signifies the composition of intellect. .. the 
existence of God does fall under demonstration; this happens when our mind 
is led from demonstrative arguments to form ... a proposition of God whereby 
it expresses that He exists.3l 
Strictly speaking, then, for Thomas, what we demonstrate is not so much that 
God exists as that some proposition affirming the existence of God is true. 32 
The actuality we can demonstrate is not the actual being of God, but the actual 
truth of a proposition.33 Now Thomas' arguments for God's existence provide 
him with identifying descriptions for God, whence he infers all the attributes 
that he subsequently ascribes to God: having argued that (for instance) an 
unmoved mover exists and is identical with God, Thomas derives divine 
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attributes by exploring the attributes which an unmoved mover must have.34 
Thus this restriction of the "actually" in "God actually exists" to the actual 
truth of a proposition extends to "an unmoved mover actually exists," and 
thence to all the theses of both rational and dogmatic theology. 
Actuality can be construed as a modality interrelated with necessity and 
possibility. Thus I suggest that on Thomas' account, ordinary modalities 
which occur in talk about God are not to be construed as modifying the divine 
being, but rather as modifying propositions about God. Specifically, such 
modalities tie these propositions to worlds in which it is correct to assert 
them. An analogy will set out what I have in mind. Were I in a delivery-room, 
watching the birth of a child, I might very well say "God has here become 
the Creator of a new person." But I would not mean by this that God occupied 
any volume of space in the delivery room, or had been just to the left of the 
operating table. Rather, I would use "here" to refer only to the place at which 
a new predicate became ascribable to God. Again, if I hold that God is 
timeless, then if I say "God is now the Creator of a new person," I will explain 
my statement by saying that "now" refers not to a time at which God is 
located, but merely to the time of the proposition's utterance, a time at which 
it is true to say that God is (timelessly) the Creator of a new person. I suggest, 
then, that by analogy, for Thomas, when we say "actually God exists and 
therefore possibly God exists," the modal terms' semantics are to be given 
in terms of possible worlds in which it is correct to affirm that God exists, 
not possible worlds in which God exists. With this given, all standard modal 
entailments apply to propositions about God (and so the claim that God is 
purely actual in no way conflicts with any truths of modal logic ). For instance, 
though God does not exist in any possible world, in every possible world it 
is true to say that God exists and that therefore, in some possible world it is 
true to say that God exists. Thus it remains the case that "God actually exists" 
entails that possibly God exists. In the same way, all tense-logical entailments 
apply to tensed propositions about a timeless God. One need not infer that 
God exists during the times one's semantics involve, nor in the worlds one's 
semantics involve. 
With this understood, we can see why God's being beyond the modal 
framework of reality does not affect the fact that there are necessary and 
contingent truths about God. These truths acquire their modal status accord-
ing as the statements they make about God are true at (not in) the various 
possible worlds, just as truths about a timeless God acquire their temporal 
status according as the statements they make are true at, not in, the various 
times. Their modal differences are functions not of differences in God but of 
differences in possible worlds. "God created Adam" is contingent not because 
God has a contingent attribute but because it is true at some but not all worlds 
that Adam exists and is created by God.3s Obviously, a full treatment of this 
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idea would require a lot more work than it can receive here. But its prospects 
strike me as promising. 
Now it is customary to introduce the de re/de dicta distinction in a rough 
and ready way by saying that modalities de re are modalities in which things 
have attributes and modalities de dicta are those in which propositions have 
truth-values. So my account thusfar raises a question: if all divine modalities 
are modalities of propositions, does it follow that they are all only de dicto? 
I think not. A more precise explication of the de re/de dicto distinction would 
note that both sorts of modalities are after all modalities of propositions. 
Following a suggestion of Kit Fine's, we may say that propositions whose 
modalities are de dicta are such that their truth-value does not vary if we vary 
the reference of their singular terms (or equivalent devices for picking out 
bearers of attributes), and propositions whose modalities are de re are such 
that their truth values do vary if we vary the reference of their singular terms 
or equivalent devices. 
In explicating what I take to have been Aquinas' implicit position, I have 
appealed to the idea that God does not exist within possible worlds. One may 
well wonder what this can mean. I think that at least two other historic 
metaphysical systems incorporate the claim that God does not exist within 
possible worlds. Arguably Leibniz, the grandfather of possible worlds seman-
tics, held that possible worlds are creatures of God which are sets or groupings 
of other creatures of God, and that God, as their creator, is not included in any 
such set. 36 Again, for Plotinus, God creates all necessary abstracta and yet 
exemplifies none, being above and beyond "the realm of Being," i.e., the 
Platonic domain. Thus the writings of Leibniz and Plotinus (as well as 
Aquinas) may give us some way to picture God's transcendence of possibility. 
A formal explication of God's transcendence of possibility might be that 
no predication of or identity-statement involving God is included in any 
world-constituting set of propositions, rather as no predication of or identity-
statement involving God is included in any group of propositions true in some 
particular moment. If one indexes propositions to times in which they are 
true, for instance, one must index all predications of or identity-statements 
involving a timeless God not to any time, but instead to one more timelike 
locus, that of eternity. Similarly, if one indexes propositions to worlds in 
which they are true, one must index all predications of and identity-statements 
involving a purely actual God not to any possible world, but instead to one 
more worldlike locus, that of pure actuality. 
IX. Vale et salve 
The claim that God is purely actual eliminates the problems we have seen 
theistic activism to face. Yet this claim does the job activism tried to do, in 
that it makes God the source of abstracta and the ground of modal facts. So 
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perhaps theistic activists might have something to gain by moving a bit closer 
to classic Thomism and its claim that God is purely actual. This is not to say 
that the claim that God is purely actual is without its own problems. The 
claim that God has no attributes which creatures instantiate, for instance, 
threatens to force us to a radically negative theology, as it did Plotinus. I 
believe that it does not force us to this, and that the concept of pure actuality 
has exciting ramifications in philosophical theology. But these will have to 
await another occasion.37 
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